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Abstract: This paper presents a market-price-based method to value sub-soil resources in environmental
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Life Cycle Assessment. The market price incorporates the privileged
information of the market agents, explicitly or implicitly anticipating future applications of the
resource, future backstop technologies, recycling potentials, the evolution of reserves and extraction
costs. The market price is therefore considered as the best available integrated information reflecting
the actual values of these parameters. Our method is based on the Hotelling rule and the fact that
private agents discount future costs and benefits at a higher rate than society as a whole. In practice,
the price of the last resource unit sold is calculated with the Hotelling rule using a market discount rate.
Then, the price at depletion is retropolated with a social discount rate smaller than the market discount
rate. The resulting corrected “socially optimal” price is higher than the market price. The method
allows to calculate the social cost of resource exhaustion, which is applicable in Cost-Benefit Analysis
and Life Cycle Assessment. The method is applied to mineral and fossil resources and the results are
compared with other recent methods that seek to place a monetary value on resource depletion.
Keywords: Hotelling; resource depletion; price correction; extraction cost; social discount rate;
external cost valuation
1. Introduction
Sub-soil resources, i.e., mineral and petrochemical resources, are exhaustible deposits, and the
potential depletion of these deposits is therefore of social concern. This concern has been addressed
from two different perspectives, an economic and a physical.
The economic perspective has pointed out—typically with reference to Hicks (1946) [1]—that the
economic rent (the revenue, net of marginal extraction costs) from an exhaustible resource should not
be regarded as income and, therefore, should not be included as value added in the Gross Domestic
Product (El Serafy, 1981 [2]), but rather must be re-invested in renewable resources so that aggregate
capital is maintained, i.e., so that a constant revenue can be sustained infinitely. Since sub-soil assets
are seldom traded on an open market, establishing the rental value can be challenging, and this
has given rise to the “Hotelling Valuation Principle” (Miller & Upton, 1985 [3]), which is derived
from the theoretical finding of Hotelling (1931) [4], who states that in a non-monopolistic market,
the optimal exhaustion rate must be one where the inflation-corrected price of the resource, net of
marginal extraction costs, grows over time at a rate equal to the discount rate. Thus, the net present
value of a resource is equal to the extractable volume multiplied by its current price, net of marginal
extraction costs. Since sub-soil assets are seldom traded on an open market, the empirical testing of
this simple principle has been limited mainly to observed market prices for oil- and gas-producing
properties, generally finding values around 0.5 (range 0.2–0.8) for the theoretical value, which Davis &
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Cairns (1999) [5] explain by incorporating uncertainty and capacity constraints in the model. Once
having determined the correct rental value, the economic perspective generally regards the Hotelling
exhaustion rate as being optimal from both a private and social perspective. As an example, the Shadow
Price Handbook published by CE Delft (de Bruyn et al., 2010 [6]) assigns a zero-shadow price for
abiotic resource depletion, implying the assumption that all social costs have already been internalised.
The physical perspective has mainly been represented by impact assessment methods developed
in the context of environmental product life cycle assessment. A large number of methods have been
developed and were recently reviewed by Sonderegger et al. (2017) [7] and Alvarenga et al. (2016) [8].
These methods can be classified into three groups depending on the procedures they use to obtain
a single measure across different resources: by mass or energy (“resource accounting methods”),
by consumption amounts relative to available stocks (“scarcity methods”), or by consequences for
future extraction (“future efforts methods”). Due to the implicit normalisation across different
resources, the resource accounting methods suggest that it is optimal to trade-off the use of resources
in proportion to their content of the selected mass or energy property, while the scarcity methods
imply a maximum social benefit when all resources reach the same level of scarcity. Only the future
efforts methods have sustainable well-being as an optimisation target, and thus come closest to the
economic perspective. However, the physical perspective implies that the impact on future well-being
is modelled via future technology scenarios, in practice resorting to different proxies such as forecasted
ore grades, energy requirements for extraction, or estimated extraction costs. Besides the inherent
uncertainty in any kind of forecasting, Northey et al. (2017) [9] described the specific issues for resource
assessment that make such forecasting difficult and highly uncertain, such as the limited availability
and inter-comparability of data on ore grades and other resource quality aspects, the high variability
of local conditions that determine resource availability, and the difficulty of predicting the effects of
disruptive technology changes. It nevertheless appears that resource-specific forecasting models, such
as those of Mohr (2010) [10], can be used to narrow down the uncertainty on earlier supply forecasts.
In this article, we present a method that seeks to unite the economic and physical perspectives,
based on the finding that the Hotelling rule will not ensure that all social costs are internalised if the
market interest rate is higher than the social discount rate. That this may well be the case has previously
been pointed out by Solow (1974) [11] and has also—in the context of Cost-Benefit Analysis—been
hinted to by Bickel & Friedrich (2005) [12] (p. 15). The concept behind the method presented here has
previously been the topic of a conference presentation (De Caevel et al., 2011 [13]).
This article exclusively addresses the social cost of depletion of sub-soil resources and does
not address the (additional) social externalities associated with the activities of mining, transport,
transformation and the use of the resources.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Hotelling’s Model and the Determinants of the Market Price
2.1.1. Time Path of the Resource Price According to Hotelling’s Model
Hotelling (1931) [4] describes how the economic rent of an exhaustible resource, i.e., its price net
of extraction costs, will increase at the same rate as the market interest rate, thereby ensuring optimal
resource allocation under the assumption of a non-monopolistic market. The rationale is as follows:
The resource owners can choose either to sell the resource at market price and to buy some assets in
the financial market with the money, or to keep the resource and to sell it later at an anticipated price.
If the market price is lower than the discounted future price, then the rational owners will keep the
resource. If the market price is higher than the discounted future price, then the owners will sell the
resource, buy financial assets on the market and eventually maximize benefits. At the equilibrium,
the net price equals the discounted anticipated price of the last unit of resource sold in the future.
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2.1.2. Causes of Market Price Differing from Socially Optimal Price
The market agents, both resource consumers and resource owners and processors, have privileged
access to information and explicitly or implicitly anticipate and integrate all the information they
have access to regarding the future applications of the resource, the future backstop technologies,
recycling potentials, and the evolution of reserves, extraction costs, interest/discount rates and other
determinants, before deciding to buy or sell the resource, so that all these aspects will be taken into
account in the market price. The market anticipations of these parameters are therefore considered as
the best available approximations of the actual values of these parameters.
The market inevitably miscalculates the future market parameters, but the resulting bias may be
both downward or upward, with one important exception: the interest or discount rate.
In his paper of 1931, Hotelling asked “The market rate of interest must be used by an entrepreneur
in his calculations, but should it be used in determinations of social value and optimum public policy?”.
While Hotelling played down the importance of this question, Solow (1974) [11] (p. 8) suggested that
“a modern economist would take that possibility more seriously”, going on to mention two examples
of reasons to think social discount rates are lower than market discount rates. One reasoning relates
to the pure time preference that is included in the market discount rate, reflecting the risks taken
by a private investor, while this risk is not included for society due to its longer time perspective
and its risk-pooling and risk-spreading (i.e., many projects and many individuals over longer time).
Another reasoning relates to taxes on capital income that may affect the private discount rate, while the
social discount rate should be indifferent to such transfers. In the subsequent considerable literature
contributing to define a social discount rate, it is generally agreed that the social discount rate is lower
than the market discount rate (Zhuang et al., 2007 [14]). Based on this difference, we propose, in the
next section, a method to estimate the social optimal price based on market price.
2.2. Correcting the Market Price
In the previous sections, we saw that the economic rent of an exhaustible resource, i.e., its price
net of extraction costs, can be used as an estimate for the social cost of consuming a unit of resource,
provided that we adjust for the difference between the market discount rate and the social discount
rate necessary for optimal resource allocation.
In order to tackle complexity gradually, we develop this adjustment in three steps. Model 1 shows
the principles of the method, assuming zero extraction cost, like in Hotelling’s model, and that price
correction has no impact on depletion time. Model 2 integrates extraction costs and is used for our
base estimate. Model 3 includes the impact of price correction on consumption and therefore on time
before depletion.
2.2.1. Model 1: Principle of the Method
In Model 1, we assume there is no extraction cost and the demand is inelastic. The models
presented in the following sections integrate extraction cost (model 2) and elastic demand (model 3).
First, we calculate the price of the last unit sold at depletion following the Hotelling rule: The resource
price rises exponentially with time at the market interest rate. Then, starting from the estimated price
of the last unit sold, we retropolate the socially optimal price using the social discount rate, as shown in
Figure 1. Since the social discount rate is lower than the market interest rate, the socially optimal price
path is flatter than the market price path. Hence, the estimated socially optimal price is higher than the
market price. The use of a socially optimal prices will transfer more welfare to the future generation
under the condition of optimal taxation and constant reinvestment rates (cf. El Serafy, 1981 [2]).
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Figure 1. Model 1: principle of the method.
2.2.2. Model 2: Integrating Extraction Cost
The Hotelling rule of exponentially increasing the price with time applies only to the scarcity rent
component of the resource price (i.e., the net price, difference between the price and the extraction
cost) and only with zero or constant extraction cost and a finite stock of a resource. In this case, the
correction of the market price follows the same method as mentioned above, but based on the net price.
The optimal net price is equal to the optimal price minus the extraction cost. Figure 2 shows the price
correction with constant positive extraction costs.
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Figure 2. odel 2: constant extraction cost.
2.2.3. Model 3: Integrating Elastic Demand
Under the common assumption of decreasing intratemporal marginal utility of consumption [15],
the demand curve for the resource is elastic, so that a rise in rice lowers the demanded quanti es.
The agents facing or expecting the optimal “correc ed” price will consume less f a esource annually
than if hey were faci g a lower, non-corrected price. So, the correction lowers the demand and xtends
the time before depletion. As the price of the last unit sold is equal to the maximum opportunity cost
of the resource, th optimal price of the resource will not rise higher t an this level. At the ilibrium,
this situation will be anti ipated and the prices will drop at each period of tim . Eve tually, the optimal
“correct d” present price will stabilize t a level somewhere between the pr ent market price and the
p al price nder in las c demand (s e Figure 3). Th higher the dem nd ela ticity, the lower the
socially op i l price.
The computed social cost of exhaustion is considered as an upper bound as the formula relies
on the rough assumption of inelastic demand (i.e., w th elastic demand, the soci l cost of exhaustion
would be lower). The value of the social cost of exhaustion lies in the interval between the market
price and the upper bound social co t of exhaustion.
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2.2.4. Applied Method in Practice
The price correction factor, cp, is calculated as the ratio between the integrals of the discount factors
over the time to depletion, calculated with the social and the market discount rates, respectively:
cp =
∫ t
0 d frs∫ t
0 d frm
, (1)
where rm is the annual market discount rate, rs is the annual social discount rate, and t is the time
before depletion in years.
To obtain the upper bound cost of depletion in absolute currency units, the price correction factor
should be multiplied on the market price of the resource net of extraction cost:
Externality cost o f exhaustion = cp ∗ net resource price. (2)
The data needed to apply the method is thus the market price of the resource net of extraction
cost, the time before depletion and the market and social discount rates.
3. Data and Assumptions
3.1. Market Price Includi g Extraction Costs
To limit the influence of short-term market volatility, we applied trend prices by taking the linear
trend for each resource for the previous 5 years based on prices available from the following sources:
US Geological Survey, World Bank, IMF, FRED and LPPM. Time lags in information movements
affecting the decision making of commercial firms as well as geopolitical issues affecting resources
prices is generally around 5 years (Kitchin cycle).
3.2. Extraction Cost
The extraction cost of a specific resource is often heterogeneous depending on the used technology,
the ore quality and the size of the field (i.e., the economies of scale). Unless resource-specific marginal
extraction cost data is available, we have calc lated the extraction cost as the difference between the
rev nue and the gross operating su pl s from Eurost t. T extraction cost represe ts between 49%
and 94% of the revenue, corresponding to a net resource price (scarcity ent) between 51% and 6%,
the former for crude petroleum and the la ter for resources with no immediate depletion horizon.
We apply this range as an uncertainty bound for the extraction cost for a resource without available
information, with 75% as the mean estimate.
3.3. Time before Depletion
For the time before depletion, t, we apply different values for the base estimate and two
sensitivity analyses:
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(1) t = time of convergence of the market and the social discount rates (our base case)
(2) t = resource-specific estimate of time before depletion (sensitivity analysis)
(3) t = resource-specific estimate of time before depletion, but not >50 years (sensitivity analysis)
Note that the time before depletion is estimated under the assumption of inelastic demand.
The first value, which is used for our base estimate, completely avoids the need to estimate the
time before depletion by instead applying the long-term convergence of the discount factors of the
market and social discounting methods. This is at the same time an upper bound estimate. Despite the
difference between the market and social discount rates, both tend to zero over a long time horizon
(300 years). For long-term horizons this implies that the integrals of the market and social discount
factors will converge to provide a fixed ratio; see Section 3.4.3. The difference between the sizes of the
integrals can then be applied as a multiplier on the net resource prices.
The second value, which is applied as a sensitivity analysis, is based on a resource-specific time
before depletion estimated with the approach of Kesler (2007) [16], by dividing the reserves in 2015
by the mine production of 2015, using data from the U.S. Geological Survey (2015) [17] and the U.S.
Energy Information Administration. The data refers to the known economically extractable reserves
and an estimation of the undiscovered resources. The approach considers that the depletion occurs
when the resource is not used anymore because its cost is greater than its opportunity cost. There
is a significant uncertainty about the consumption scenarios and the future willingness to pay for
the resources. This is therefore a rough estimation that might overestimate the time to depletion
because the global demand for most resources will probably increase or might underestimate the time
to depletion by not accounting for the addition of new reserves over time; which of the two effects that
dominates is uncertain. For resources without data, we applied a default value of 100 years.
The third value, which is also applied as a sensitivity analysis, is similar to the second, but with
an upper limit of 50 years. This upper limit is based on the idea that resources with longer time before
depletion cannot meaningfully carry a scarcity rent.
3.4. Social and Market Discount Rates
To estimate the optimal price, we are interested in the difference between the market and social
discount rate across time because the higher the discount rate difference, the higher the optimal price.
To the knowledge of the authors, there is no literature that links precisely, in a quantitative way,
the market and the social discount rates, although there is plenty of literature on both topics.
3.4.1. The Social Discount Rate
Given that the future growth rate is uncertain, the certainty-equivalent social discount rate will
decrease over time. There is general agreement (Arrow et al., 2012, 2013 [18,19]) that “uncertainty about
future discount rates provides a strong generic rationale for using certainty-equivalent discount rates
that decline over time” (Weitzman, 1998 [20]). Accordingly, we apply a hyperbolic declining social
discount rate over time. We apply social discount rates based on the starting value of 3% of the Green
Book (2008) [21] rates used in the UK, with the equiprobable interest rate scenarios of Weitzman’s
declining certainty-equivalent discount rate model varying from 1% to 5%.
3.4.2. The Market Discount Rate
For the base case, we apply a constant market discount rate of 5.5% based on the average long-term
real return on the stock market.
In a sensitivity analysis, we apply the declining certainty-equivalent discount rate method of
Weitzman (1998) [20] also for the market discount rate, with a starting point of 5.5% and an equiprobable
interest rates from 1% to 10%. A declining market discount rate in the long run was found empirically
by Giglio et al. (2014) [22], comparing the price difference between comparable freeholds and very long
run leaseholds properties on the housing market in the UK and Singapore using hedonic regressions.
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They derive downward sloping market discount rates for private agents. They found that discount
rates below 2.6% are used to value 100-year leasehold properties compared to similar freeholds ones,
which is close to the value derived from our application of the Weitzman method for the market
discount rate.
3.4.3. Evolution of the Discount Factors and Derivation of the Socially Optimal Price
The evolution of the applied discount rates and discount factors over time evolutions are shown
in Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 6 shows how the integrals of the s t factors and the market discount factors
develop over time and how the difference bet ee t e i te rals converge towards a constant value
(see figure below). This difference is applied for computing the socially optimal resource prices.
The optimal resource prices will be higher with the constant market discount rates (base case) than
when assuming decreasing market discount rates (sensitivity analysis).
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4. Results
Results are presented for the recommended base case and for five sensitivity analyses for different
assumptions on discounting and the time before depletion. The base case (shown in grey in Figure 7)
applies the constant market discount rate and the “convergence of the discount factors” approach
from Figure 6. Figure 7 illustrates the different data that go into the model and thus also the model
uncertainties and assumptions. For the market price and the extraction costs, uncertainties are
dominated by data uncertainty that can be expressed as stochastic uncertainties around the base case
mean value, while the uncertainties on discounting and the time before depletion are dominated
by model uncertainty and are taken into account through sensitivity analyses with the different
modelling assumptions.
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4.1. Externality Cost of Depletion of Sub-Soil Resources
Table 1 shows the price correction factors for the net resource prices for the base case (constant
market discount rate at 5.5%, and t = 300) with sensitivity analyses for t = 50 and declining market
discount rates, respectively. It can be seen that the applied base case is also a worst case, providing an
upper bound for the values compared to those of the sensitivity analyses. This is readily understandable,
since the difference between the social and market discount rates increase over time, and the difference
is smaller for the market declining market rate than for the constant market rate (see Figure 6).
Table 1. Price correction factors for the base case and two sensitivity analyses.
Using Constant Market Discount Rate Using Declining Market Discount Rates
t = 300 (Base Case) t = 50 t = 300 t = 50
2.42 1.60 1.54 1.36
Table 2 shows, for a selection of resources, the resulting externality cost of depletion that should
be added to the market prices of the resources in order to obtain the socially optimal prices. Table A1
in the Appendix A provides values for a more complete list of resources. The values are expressed
relative to the market price. For t = 300, the only differences between resources occur as a result of
differences in extraction costs—and thereby in economic rent—relative to the market prices including
extraction costs. The other two scenarios are obviously additionally influenced by the estimated time
before depletion.
All results are considered as upper bounds as they have been calculated under the assumption of
inelastic demand (see Section 2.2.3). Introducing elastic demand would result in values for the external
cost of depletion between the market price and the values presented in Table 1.
4.2. Limitations
Modelling assumptions and data quality are the main aspects limiting the robustness of the
proposed factors.
4.2.1. Modelling Assumptions Limits
Resources are often characterized by growing extraction cost because man has to dig deeper or
because the resource purity decreases. Nevertheless, extraction costs may also decrease, e.g., due to
technological progress. We simplified the extraction cost evolution by assuming that the extraction
cost is constant. This simplification mostly harms the robustness of the estimated optimal prices
for resources combining the high extraction cost component in the price and significant anticipated
evolution of the extraction costs. If the extraction cost is increasing instead of being constant, the
proposed price correction is too large and vice-versa.
The starting point of the method is the market price. The current price reflects sometimes only
a short-term situation (e.g., a bubble, geopolitics). To obtain price estimates that can be used in the
medium term, we recommend taking a 5-year linear trend price. We take the prices as they are and
do not correct it for market conditions like lack of competition, geopolitical issues, etc. It is uncertain
whether the bias is upwards or downwards for a resource.
Other modelling assumptions have been included as sensitivity analyses, showing that our base
estimates can be seen as representing the upper bound required for price corrections.
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Table 2. Upper bound externality cost of depletion for different resources, expressed relative to the resource prices (absolute correction divided by the resource price).
Resources
5-Year Extraction Estimated Time Upper Bound Externality Cost of Depletion Relative to the Resource Prices
Trend Price
(€ 2017/kg) Cost/Price
Before Depletion
(Years)
Using Constant Market Discount Rate Using Declining Market Discount Rate
t = 300
(base case) t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50 t = 300 t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50
Antimony 6.29 75% 13 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.28
Bauxite 0.02 75% 71 0.60 0.45 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.34
Bismuth 16.2 75% 27 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.31
Boron 0.43 75% 64 0.60 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.34
Chromium 1.95 75% 18 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.29
Coal 0.05 82% 113 0.43 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.25
Cobalt 24.4 75% 57 0.60 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.34
Copper 3.92 54% 39 1.11 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.60
Crude petroleum 0.22 57% 49 1.04 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.58
Fluorspar 0.21 75% 40 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.33
Gold 30,000 75% 19 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
Graphite (natural) 1.01 75% 193 0.60 0.58 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Iodine 28 75% 248 0.60 0.59 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Iron ore 0.04 70% 26 0.72 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.37 0.37
Lead 1.61 75% 19 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
Lithium 4.02 75% 431 0.60 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34
Manganese 1.13 75% 34 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.32
Molybdenum 14.5 75% 41 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.33
Nickel 7.44 75% 31 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.32
Palladium 20,800 75% 171 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Peat 0.02 84% 435 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.22
Phosphate rocks 0.07 75% 309 0.60 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34
Platinum 22,100 75% 171 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Rhenium 2180 75% 54 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Silver 360 75% 21 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
Strontium 0.32 75% 21 0.60 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.30
Tantalum 213 75% 83 0.60 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.34
Tin 14.6 75% 16 0.60 0.3 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.29
Titanium dioxide 2.1 75% 42 0.60 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.33
Titanium metal 9.12 75% 130 0.60 0.53 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Tungsten 35.3 75% 38 0.60 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.33
Vanadium 15.7 75% 189 0.60 0.57 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Zinc 1.96 75% 15 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.34 0.29
Zirconium 0.59 75% 55 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
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4.2.2. Data Limitations
Extraction costs of resources are heterogeneous depending on the technology, the ore quality and
the size of the fields. Only low-quality, average extraction costs data are accessible. The extraction costs
are derived from data on revenues and gross operating surplus. For resource without such information,
we take as a default value that the extraction cost is equal to 75% of the market price (based on the
average of resources listed in Eurostat [23]). Empirical extraction cost data from the industry could
improve the reliability of the extraction cost data.
The base case does not use an assumption on the time before depletion because it is based on the
convergence of the market and social discount rates. Nevertheless, the second and third methods (used
as sensitivity analysis) assume a specific time before depletion. There is a significant uncertainty on
the time to economic depletion, depending on the consumption scenarios and the future willingness to
pay for the resource. We estimated the time before depletion with the known economically extractable
reserves and the estimation of the undiscovered resources divided by the mine production of 2014
from U.S. Geological Survey (2015) [17]. Future unexpected mine production increases/decreases are
not taken into account. The time before depletion can be longer or shorter depending on the uncertain
resources discoveries and the actual consumption.
5. Comparison to Other Methods
In this section, we compare the results of our method with two recent methods that also seek to
place a monetary value on the contribution to resource depletion (Table 3).
Table 3. Comparison of our results with those of other recent methods.
Resource
Externality Cost of Depletion
Results from This Study
(Computed from Table A1)
(EUR2017/kg)
EPS 2015
(Steen, 2015 [24,25])
(EUR2015/kg)
Surplus Cost Potential Method
(Vieira et al., 2016 [26])
(USD2013/kg)
Chromium 1.2 59.5
Coal 0.023 0.16
Cobalt 15 179
Copper 4.4 90.9 0.74
Gold 18 150 2 020 000
Iron Ore 0.027 0.85 0.022
Manganese 0.7 4.92 4.42
Molybdenum 8.8 2 430 3.97
Nickel 4.5 107 5.62
Palladium 12 585 6 860 000 2480
Silver 217 72 800 114
Tin 8.8 482
Titanium 5.8 0.89
Tungsten 21.3 3 350
Uranium 26.0 340 29
Vanadium 9.5 34
Crude petroleum 0.23 0.47
Zinc 1.19 32 6.69
The EPS method (Steen, 2015 [24,25]) explicitly applies a restoration cost approach, assuming that
no substitution will be made before mining has to be done from the average concentration of the Earth’s
crust, using only biomass energy sources and currently existing technologies. Extraction costs under
these conditions are calculated without any discounting. Not surprisingly, the values obtained are an
order of magnitude higher than ours, or higher, although titanium is a notable exception. The relatively
high economic rent for crude petroleum is also reflected in the relatively high externality costs in our
results and, therefore, there is a relatively smaller difference to the EPS results.
The Surplus Cost Potential method (Vieira et al., 2016 [26]) calculates the cost of future extraction
by extrapolating a cumulative cost-tonnage curve and fitting to production cost data from 2000 to 2013.
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The results are not systematically higher or lower than our results, but there are significant deviations
for several minerals.
6. Conclusions
Sub-soil resource depletion is of great concern in environmental assessment and is also used as an
argument for a more circular economy. The issue is to assess the real value of one unit of resource,
i.e., the burden for society of not having it in the future, or in a less usable form, due to its present
consumption. It is particularly significant when making decision about renewable energy, waste
recycling, and the use of new technologies that use sub-soil resources.
The valuation methods used in Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) are found to be unsatisfying by the
recent reviews, while Cost Benefit Analyses (CBA) typically values sub-soil resources assuming that
there is no issue of too fast depletion (real value = market price). In this paper, we have provided and
demonstrated the applicability of a method to value sub-soil resources in LCA and in environmental
CBA, based on information given by the market.
We calculate a price correction based on the Hotelling rule and the fact that private agents discount
future costs and benefits at a higher rate than society as a whole. The price of the last resource unit sold
is calculated with the Hotelling rule and a market discount rate. We assumed constant extraction costs.
Then, the socially optimal price is calculated by retropolating the price at depletion the Hotelling rule
and the social discount rate.
Our method provides recommended social cost factors for sub-soil resources to be used in CBA
and as market-based characterization factors in LCA. The specific advantage of our method, compared
to previous methods, is that it is based exclusively on information provided in the market, thereby
avoiding the need for more or less speculative assumptions
Uncertainties relate to the choice of the social and market discount rates, the price elasticity of the
future demand for resources and the quality of the data (market prices, extraction costs and time before
depletion). However, even under high uncertainty, the use of market data provides more reliable social
cost information than methods based on expert opinion on future scenarios.
Further research should improve the quality of the input data and try to determine the price
elasticity of the future demand for resources. The biggest challenge to improve the method is the
estimation of the extraction cost because currently default extraction cost values are used for most of
the resources.
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and S.S.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Upper bound externality cost of depletion for different resources, expressed relative to the resource prices (absolute correction divided by the resource price).
Resources
5-Year Extraction Estimated Time Upper Bound Externality Cost of Depletion Relative to the Resource Prices
Trend Price
(€ 2017/kg) Cost/Price
Before Depletion
(Years)
Using Constant Market Discount Rate Using Declining Market Discount Rate
t = 300
(Base Case) t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50 t = 300 t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50
Abrasives (natural) 0.15 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Aluminium 1.39 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Antimony 6.29 75% 13 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.28
Arsenic 0.77 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Asbestos 1.66 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Barite 0.12 75% 51 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Bauxite 0.02 75% 71 0.60 0.45 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.34
Beryllium 419 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Bismuth 16.2 75% 27 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.31
Boron 0.43 75% 64 0.60 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.34
Bromine 1.13 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Cadmium 1.29 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Cement 0.09 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Caesium 66,000 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Chromium 1.95 75% 18 0.60 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.29
Clay 0.05 85% 100 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20
Coal 0.05 82% 113 0.43 0.37 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.25
Cobalt 24.4 75% 57 0.60 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.34
Copper 3.92 54% 39 1.11 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.60
Crude petroleum 0.22 57% 49 1.04 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.58
Diamond (industrial) 959 75% 13 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.28
Diatomite 0.26 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Feldspar 0.09 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Fluorspar 0.21 75% 40 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.33
Gallium 259 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Garnet (industrial) 0.25 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Gemstones 35,900 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Germanium 1390 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Gold 30,000 75% 19 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
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Table A1. Cont.
Resources
5-Year Extraction Estimated Time Upper Bound Externality Cost of Depletion Relative to the Resource Prices
Trend Price
(€ 2017/kg) Cost/Price
Before Depletion
(Years)
Using Constant Market Discount Rate Using Declining Market Discount Rate
t = 300
(Base Case) t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50 t = 300 t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50
Graphite (natural) 1.01 75% 193 0.60 0.58 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Gypsum 0.01 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Hafnium 516 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Helium 18.9 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Indium 495 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Iodine 28 75% 248 0.60 0.59 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Iron ore 0.04 70% 26 0.72 0.39 0.39 0.46 0.37 0.37
Iron oxide pigments 1.09 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Kyanite 0.31 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Lead 1.61 75% 19 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
Lime 0.11 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Lithium 4.02 75% 431 0.60 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34
Magnesium metal 4.11 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Manganese 1.13 75% 34 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.32
Mercury 46.6 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Mica (scrap and flake) 2.82 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Molybdenum 14.5 75% 41 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.33
Natural gas, LNG 5.02 85% 57 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20
Natural gas, US 2.16 85% 57 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20
Natural gas, Europe 3.24 85% 57 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20
Nickel 7.44 75% 31 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.32 0.32
Nitrogen 0.48 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Palladium 20,800 75% 171 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Peat 0.02 84% 435 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.22
Perlite 0.05 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Phosphate 0.07 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Phosphate rocks 0.07 75% 309 0.60 0.61 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34
Platinum 22,100 75% 171 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.34
Potash 0.48 75% 95 0.60 0.49 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Potassium chloride 0.17 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Propane 0.10 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Pumice 0.03 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Rare earth 5.43 75% 1048 0.60 0.62 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.34
Rhenium 2180 75% 54 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Salt 0.04 83% 100 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.23
Sand/gravel (industrial) 0.05 85% 100 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20
Selenium 34.3 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Silicon 2.14 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
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Table A1. Cont.
Resources
5-Year Extraction Estimated Time Upper Bound Externality Cost of Depletion Relative to the Resource Prices
Trend Price
(€ 2017/kg) Cost/Price
Before Depletion
(Years)
Using Constant Market Discount Rate Using Declining Market Discount Rate
t = 300
(Base Case) t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50 t = 300 t = specific
t = specific;
max. 50
Silver 360 75% 21 0.60 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.30 0.30
Sodium carbonate 0.13 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Sodium sulfate 0.14 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Stone (crushed) 0.01 85% 100 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20
Stone (dimension) 0.15 85% 100 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20
Strontium 0.32 75% 21 0.60 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.30
Sulfur 0.06 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Talc and Pyrophyllite 0.19 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Tantalum 213 75% 83 0.60 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.34
Tellurium 40.2 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Thallium 6520 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Thorium 249 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Tin 14.6 75% 16 0.60 0.3 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.29
Titanium dioxide 2.1 75% 42 0.60 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.33
Titanium metal 9.12 75% 130 0.60 0.53 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Tungsten 35.3 75% 38 0.60 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.33
Uranium 43 75% 100 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.34
Vanadium 15.7 75% 189 0.60 0.57 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Wollastonite 0.19 75% 164 0.60 0.56 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
Zinc 1.96 75% 15 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.39 0.34 0.29
Zirconium 0.59 75% 55 0.60 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.34
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